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Abstract: Japanese financial policies during the so called High Growth Period (HGP- 
roughly 1953-1973) stand at sharp contrast with the presumptions of the financial 
liberalization  literature.  Against  the  Japanese  example,  McKinnon  (1991)  and 
Horiuchi (1984) have argued, based on relatively high interest rates in Japan during 
this period compared to developed economies,  that the Japanese financial market was 
not repressed. In this paper, Japanese financial policies during the HGP are examined 
to show  the heavy and distortionary but purposeful government intervention in the 
financial  markets.  Moreover  evidence  is provided  against  those  of  McKinnon  and 
Horiuchi  to  show  that  major  interest  rates  have  been  repressed  during  the  HGP. 
Finally,  the  reasons  that  forced  the  Japanese  government  to  implement  financial 
liberalization after 1973 are discussed. These reasons do not include considerations 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The evolution of the financial industry in Japan has interesting characteristics. The 
degree of liberalization of the financial sector had fluctuated over the decades. In the 
first phases of development, liberal practices dominated. Starting with the 1920s, and 
especially between 1953 and 1973, financial markets were highly regulated. During 
this period (High Growth Period-HGP), unprecedented growth rates in the real side of 
the  economy  were  achieved.    This  was  achieved  by  high  investment  rates.  For 
example, the ratio of U.S. output of investment goods to that of Japan fell from 7.1 to 
2.2 between 1960 and 19741. During the same period, the average rate of growth of 
capital input in Japan was more than double that in the U.S.2 
  During the HGP, the level of gross capital formation of the private business 
sector has increased seven fold3. This naturally imposed an enormous pressure on the 
Japanese financial sector which fulfilled its functions succesfully. 
  After 1973, and especially after 1984, a wave of liberalization emerged as a 
result of a combination of internal and external factors. In this liberalization process, 
growth  considerations  played  almost  no  role.  Instead,  international  factors  can  be 
attributed an important role in the acceleration of the efforts for liberalization. 
  The highly regulated financial environment between 1953 and 1973 attracted 
special attention in the literature. Financial regulations in this period set deposit rate 
ceilings, suppressed bond and equity markets and effectively isolated the Japanese 
financial markets from the world financial markets. The banks thus became the single 
most  important  financial  institution  and  effectively  transferred  the  personal  sector 
surpluses to the corporate sector which borrowed heavily for its physical investments. 
Financial liberalization came only after the high growth period was over for reasons 
not related to growth. 
  This takes us to an interesting debate. As is well known, it is argued in the 
financial  liberalization  literature  pioneered  by  Goldsmith  (1969),  Cameron  (1967), 
Gurley and Shaw (1960) and more recently revived by McKinnon (1973) and again 
Shaw (1973) that financial repression leads to low saving and this constraint limits the 
available  funds  for  physical  investments.  Liberal  financial  policies,  by  raising  or 
totally  liberalizing  interest  rate  ceilings,  are  consequently  advocated  to  increase 
financial  savings.  Increased  financial  savings  are  presumed  to  be,  subsequently, 
transferred to capital investments thus increasing the growth rates. 
  The  Japanese  experience stands in contrast to these arguments as it is one 
where  high  growth  rates  were  achieved  in  the  presence  of  high  government 
involvement/intervention in financial markets.  
  Against this paradox McKinnon (1991) and Horiuchi (1984) have argued that 
Japanese financial markets were not repressed by presenting data on Japanese interest 
rates  during  the  HGP  which  were  above  the  rates  prevailing  in  the  developed 
countries.  
Such a discussion hinges heavily on the definition of repression. There is a tendency 
to define financial repression in an operational way and rather narrowly as existence 
of regulations that fixes interest rates and causes real interest rates to become negative 
under accelerating inflation. A broader and formally more correct definition that does 
not also contradict the McKinnon-Shaw view includes however any set of financial 
regulations that distort the decentralized allocation mechanism in a financial market. 
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Such a definition of course includes the narrower one mentioned above but not limited 
to interest rate policies. In other words low interest rates are neither a sufficient nor a 
necessary condition for a financial market to be “repressed”.  
  In  this  paper  I  take  up  McKinnon  and  Horiuchi’s  argument  that  the  HGP 
growth was achieved in a non-repressed market. The more ambitious and different 
task of investigating the causal relationship between the financial policies and the real 
growth performance are not pursued here. Instead, the aim here is to pinpoint the fact 
that Japanese financial markets during the HGP were “repressed” according to the 
broader  definition  above.  To  do  this,  first  the  working  of  the  Japanese  financial 
markets is explained with the role of government. Second, data on Japanese interest 
rates will be provided to show that contrary to what has been argued by McKinnon 
(1991) and Horiuchi (1984) the level of interest rates also do not lend support to the 
McKinnon-Horiuchi  view.  Finally,  the  reasons  that  forced  the  government  to 
implement liberalization after 1973 are discussed. 
  The  organization  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  In  the  second  section  the 
regulatory environment in the financial sector and the structure of interest rates are 
explained to show the extent of government involvement in the financial sector during 
the  HGP.  The  third  section  discusses  the  main  factors  that  led  to  the  financial 
liberalization  arguing  that  it  was  mainly  the  international  factors  that  pressed  for 
financial  liberalization  and  growth  considerations  did  not  play  a  role  in  this 
liberalization. The last section concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. HIGH GROWTH PERIOD AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 
 
An international comparison of the interest rates prevailing in Japan during the HGP 
demonstrates that the Japanese interest were at least not lower than the prevailing 
interest rates in the developed countries4. This led McKinnon (1991) and Horiuchi 
(1984)  to present, mistakenly according to our view, Japan during the HGP as having 
an unrepressed financial market.  
  Due to what characteristics is a financial market said to be repressed? Is it 
adequate to consider, comparatively, the nominal or real levels interest rates which is 
what  McKinnon  and  Horiuchi  did?  In  the  literature,  a  number  of  different 
characteristics are taken, implicitly, as indicators of financial repression. Examples 
are: existence of selective credit policies; suppression of certain markets and certain 
financial instruments such as bond markets; high reserve requirements, etc. It should 
therefore  be  recognized  formally  that  repression  is  more  than  an  interest  rate 
phenomenon. In a formal approach, financial repression entails the existence of any 
excessive  government  intervention  in  the  financial  market  which  might  lead  to 
distortions  in  the  price  formation  mechanism.  Moreover,  although  “repression”  is 
generally taken to have a negative meaning, such government interventions per se 
might  well  be  based  on  economic  theory  and  might  have  welfare  improving 
implications if the financial market is already plagued with imperfections5.  
  Given  this  broad  and  formally  more  correct  definition  of  repression,  it  is 
apparent that whether or not a financial market is “repressed” can be measured by two 
different  indicators.  The  first  is  the  degree  and  the  form  of  the  government’s 
involvement/intervention in the financial market. In a ‘liberal’ financial environment 
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(if  there  exists  one)  the  government’s  involvement  is  thought  to  be  limited  to  
safeguarding  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  financial  market  and  minimizing  the 
possible social costs from asymmetry of information between the agents. The more the 
government’s area of involvement beyond this basic border, the more the market can 
be said to be “repressed”.  
  The second indicator is the prices in the financial market which is a direct 
outcome  of  the  first  factor  above.  Here,  however,  care  is  needed  when  inferring 
conclusions from interest rates about the degree of repression. Prices are indicators of 
the relative scarcity of a good or  factor in a market. In an economy closed to capital 
movements the scarcity argument applies to the domestic financial market. In such a 
closed economy, it might be just natural to see a price (here interest rate) go beyond 
the  same  price  in  another  economy.  If    such  a  situation  exists,  it  is  clearly  not 
reasonable to argue that the former  economy is not repressed simply because the 
interest rates are high compared to another country(ies). 
  In the rest of this section we will examine the HGP period from these two 
angles separately and try to show the high degree and numerous modes of government 
involvement in the financial markets and the ensuing ‘low’ interest rates. 
 
Government Intervention and Regulations  in the Financial Markets during the HGP 
 
Japan has displayed very high growth rates between 1953 and 1972. From the vantage 
point of this paper the interesting characteristic of the high growth period (HGP) was 
the celebrated fact that the Japanese financial markets during this period were highly 
regulated. Moreover, this period of regulation was followed by a more liberal financial 
environment. Thus the question arises on the role of the regulated financial markets on 
the Japanese high growth. In this section the financial policies and the channels of 
government intervention during the HGP will be discussed.  
  As Teranishi (1988)6, we can roughly classify the Japanese financial markets 
during the HGP for our purposes as follows:  
 
(a) Indirect finance:   
private financial system (deposit market and loan market) 
government financial system (postal savings market and loan market) 
 
(b) Direct finance:  
securities market ( bond market, stock market, short term money market) 
 
On  a  more  systematic  basis,  the  major  categories  of  financial  regulations  can  be 
classified  under  three  headings.  The  first  was  the  regulation  of  interest  rates. 
Regulation and supervision of the interest rates were conducted by the Bank of Japan 
and  the  Ministry  of  Finance  (MOF).  A  key  instrument  in  this  regard  was  the 
Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment Law (TIRAL)7. However, the issue of interest 
rate regulation and its efffectiveness have become one of controversy as explained 
earlier and will be discussed in more detail in the next subsection.  
  The second important group of financial regulations involved the entry into 
financial markets. The bond and equity markets were deliberately suppressed. Entry 
into the bond market, short term money market and stock exchange were regulated. 
Corporate bond issuance was limited to companies in the basic industries. This limited 
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the bond supply in the markets. On the other hand, the price of newly issued bonds 
were kept artificially high, which was another factor that limited the size of the bond 
market. 
  The  third  subgroup  of  financial  regulations  limited  international  capital 
movements. This effectively isolated Japan from the international financial climate 
during the HGP. 
  Financial  regulations  effectively  made  banks  -especially  city  banks  among 
them- the most  important financial institution category during the HGP as the bond 
and equity markets were suppressed and international financial access was eliminated.  
  Once  the  more  difficult  part  of  the  task,  namely  maintaining  high 
intermediation  in  the  presence  of  fixed  -low-  interest  rates  has  been  somehow 
achieved, the rest of the story is easier to follow. The triad among the government, 
large  companies  and  banks  effectively  managed  the  transfer  of  funds  originating 
mainly from the private household sector to investments of the corporate sector (Table 
1). 
  The government's part was, on the one hand, regulating the financial market 
which enabled the banks to collect funds at low rates. On the other hand it participated 
directly in the financing process. This was achieved through both BOJ refinancing and 
government's direct funding of fixed investments (Table 2). The direct government 
funding  was  managed  under  the  Fiscal  Investments  and  Loans  Program  (FILP)8. 
Government managed this by developing a constructive fiscal stance during the HGP 
period in keeping the deficits small or running surpluses. This not only prevented 
crowding  out  enabling  financial  resources  of  the  economy  to  be  allocated  almost 
entirely to private sector but also, as mentioned above, allowed government to actually 
participate in the financing process by directly lending to private sector under the FILP 
9. 
  The government regulation aimed at a general reduction of the cost of funds to 
the business enterprises for investments in physical capital and working capital. The 
priority sectors of Japanese industrial policy10 were the major beneficiaries both in 
terms of  lower cost of funds and of availability of credit. BOJ, on its part, followed an 
accommodating monetary stance in supplying the necessary credits to (city) banks 
whenever there was need. BOJ’s window guidance (madoguchi no shido) -in the form 
of refinancing banks-  was used as a carrot to reward investments in priority sectors 
designated by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and MOF. In 
this process the Japan Development Bank (JDB) also played an important role11.  
  Government  incentives  for  private  fixed  investments,  combined  with  low 
interest rates naturally caused excess demand for funds. The consequence of this for 
companies was the overborrowing situation. This, as stressed by Suzuki (1980), was 
not necessarily the direct source or consequence of the bank overloan situation, which 
will  be  discussed  later.  Rather,  the  two  were  different  phenomena  with  different 
sources but they were "inextricably entwined" during the Japanese HGP period. The 
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overborrowing of companies had two main reasons. The first was the high ratios of 
external financing among Japanese firms. The second was the dominance of indirect 
finance.  The  natural  reason  for  the  external  financing  requirements  was  the  high 
corporate sector deficits. This deficit was 65% of gross corporate income in 1956-60, 
51% in 1961-65, 34% in 1966-70 and 58% in 1971-7412. The second factor derived 
from the deliberate design of regulations which caused the underdeveloped state of the 
bond and equity markets and thus the dominance of commercial banks in the financial 
sector. Even the pension funds and insurance companies preferred direct lending to 
companies rather than investing in securities13. 
 
 
TABLE 1:  FLOW OF FUNDS BETWEEN HOUSEHOLD 
CORPORATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS 
YEAR  HOUSEHOLD  CORPORATE PUBLIC  FOREIGN 
1954  6,5  -3,9  -2  -0,5 
1955  7,6  -4,4  -2,2  -0,9 
1956  7  -7  -0,1  0,1 
1957  7,1  -9,8  0,7  2 
1958  6,3  -4,5  -0,4  -1,4 
1959  9,5  -7,7  -0,9  -1 
1960  8,9  -9  0,5  -0,3 
1961  8,8  -11,5  0,8  1,8 
1962  9  -8  -1,1  0,1 
1963  7,7  -7,5  -1,4  1,1 
1964  9,3  -7,6  -2,3  0,6 
1965  7,9  -4,5  -3,2  -1,1 
1966  9,1  -4,8  -4,1  -1,2 
1967  9,4  -7,3  -3,1  0,2 
1968  9,1  -6,7  -2,8  -0,7 
1969  8,7  -6,9  -2,8  -1,3 
1970  8,2  -7,2  -1  -1 
1971  9,6  -6,3  -1,9  -2,5 
1972  11,5  -7,9  -2,7  -2,2 
1973  8,8  -7,6  -2,8  0 
1974  10,3  -8,5  -3,7  1 
1975  10,5  -4,1  -7,3  0,1 
1976  11,4  -3,9  -7,6  -0,6 
1977  11,2  -2,6  -7,3  -1,5 




Since the Meiji period, the banks had the important role (or the “task”) of focusing the 
resources  of  the  capital-poor  economy:  Hence  their prominence  dated back  to  the 
Meiji period:  
 
Under  the  Meiji  Slogan  of  shokusankogyo  ("encouraging  industrialization  and 
fostering entrepreneurial spirit"), the accumulation of real physical capital before 
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there were sufficient funds available from the build-up of  privately held assets or 
from bank deposits, required the banks to become aggressive lenders...(Suzuki 
1980, p. 22). 
 
During this process of transferring the funds they collected to the firms, the banks had 
mainly two problems. Firstly, their holdings of corporate bonds were not resalable in 
the market unless for a loss due to the mentioned artificially high initial pricing of 
bonds. Secondly, their deposit base was, on the average, of much shorter maturity than 
their loans. Both of these factors were sources of liquidity problems which was the 
main reason of the accommodating stance of the BOJ14. The BOJ credits to banks 
took the form of either rediscounting the commercial bills or the repurchase of bonds 
from banks at preferential prices.  
  The  excess  demand  for  -city- bank  funds,  and the city banks' eagerness to 
accommodate this led to overlending by the city banks. The ensuing overloan situation 
refers to the negative reserve position of the banking system; the borrowing of the 
banking system from the BOJ being bigger in magnitude than the reserves held by the 
banks at the BOJ15. Hence the importance of the BOJ refinancing. Though this was 
the situation at the aggregate level, not all types of banks overlent during the HGP 
period. It was the city banks which were having their loans refinanced by the BOJ and 
by the local banks. This situation is referred to as the imbalance of the bank liquidity.  
This  imbalance  between  the  liquidity  status  of  city  banks  and  other  financial 
institutions pushed the call rates to high levels compared to the other rates, which was 
peculiar to Japan. 
 
TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE SHARE OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING 
IN TOTAL FIXED INVESTMENTS BY SECTORS 
  1954-60  1961-67 
MINING (COAL MINING)  25.7 (37.2)  39.9 (65.9) 
STEEL  4.6  3.6 
MACHINE  11.3  9.5 
CHEMICAL  8.1  7.1 
TEXTILES  14.2  14.7 
AGRI. AND FISHERIES  52.9  47.9 
ELECTRICITY  32.4  19.7 
MARINE TRANSPORTATION  33.9  50.9 
LAND TRANSPORTATION  10.4  21.9 
Source: Teranishi (1980). 
 
The task of banks in supporting the development process was alleviated by regulatory 
provisions.  Teranishi  (1988)  suggests  the  existence  of  three  forms  of  subsidies  to 
banks. First, the subsidy due to bank borrowings from the BOJ at discount rates which 
were consistently lower than the call rates. The BOJ thus made two favors to the 
banks at a time: she provided refinancing when needed and secondly, this provision 
was made at subsidized rates. Second, subsidies due to implicit taxation from bond 
holdings.  Third,  subsidies  arising  from  deposit  rate  ceilings.  Teranishi  presents 
evidence that the third part, subsidies arising from deposit rate ceilings, is by far the 
major item in the total: 69.7% in 1966-70 and 82.9% in 1971-75. 
 
The Level of Interest Rates  
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In  the  previous  subsection  we  briefly  explained  the  degree  of  involvement  and 
intervention of the government in the financial market at large. We now turn to the 
issue of interets rates in more detail.  
  There is no controversy in the literature about the fact that the deposit rates 
were strictly regulated and that the banks observed the ceilings. As seen in Figure 1, 
the  nominal  deposit  rates  remained  at  4%  during  the  HGP.  Similarly,  there  is  no 
controversy on the issue that there were interest rates that were not regulated such as 
the call money rates, telephone bond rates and Gensaki (repo) rates. 
  One  of  the main puzzles about the financial aspects of HGP was the high 
record of financial savings under binding deposit rate ceilings. Contrary to the -now- 
orthodox belief that financial repression would lead to financial shallowness, in Japan, 
the level of financial intermediation stayed at very high levels during HGP (Table 3). 
This represented considerable financial depth when compared even to industrialized 
countries16. One possible reason for this surprising fact, as proposed by some scholars 
is the limited range of assets available to savers with non-negative real deposit rates. 
The  underdeveloped  state  of  securities  markets,  absence  of  access  to  international 
financial markets left the savers with the bank deposits as the only financial asset. 
This explanation however fails to explain the experiences of  other countries which 
had quite a few similarities in this regard but which had very low financial deepening 
during the regulation period17. 
 
TABLE 3: INTEREST RATES AND FINANCIAL DEEPENING DURING HGP  
 
  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973 
INTEREST RATES                         
NOMINAL                         
DISCOUNT RATE,%   (1)    6,6  5,8  6,6  5,5  5,5  5,8  5,8  6,3  6,0  4,8  4,3 
AVERAGE DEPOSIT RATE(%)  4,0  4,0  4,0  4,0  4,0  4,0  4,0  4,0  4,0  4,0  3,9  4,0 
AVERAGE LENDING RATE(%)  8,2  7,8  7,9  7,8  7,5  7,3  7,5  7,4  7,7  7,6  7,1  7,2 
       ADJUSTED, 25% (2)    7,4  6,5  7,4  6,0  6,0  6,5  6,5  7,0  6,7  5,0  4,3 
       ADJUSTED, 40%(2)    8,3  7,1  8,3  6,5  6,5  7,1  7,1  7,8  7,3  5,3  4,4 
REAL (EX-POST,WPI)                         
DISCOUNT RATE(%)     4,6  5,8  5,6  3,1  3,6  4,9  3,6  2,5  6,9  3,9  -10,0 
AVERAGE DEPOSIT RATE (%)    2,1  4,0  3,0  1,7  2,2  3,1  1,8  0,4  4,9  3,0  -10,2 
AVERAGE LENDING RATE(%)    5,8  7,9  6,8  5,1  5,4  6,5  5,1  3,9  8,5  6,2  -7,5 
    ADJUSTED, 25% (1)    5,4  6,5  6,4  3,6  4,1  5,5  4,2  3,3  7,6  4,2  -9,9 
    ADJUSTED, 40%(1)    6,3  7,1  7,3  4,1  4,6  6,1  4,8  4,0  8,2  4,5  -9,9 
FINANCIAL DEEPENING                         
M2/GNP (%)  71,2  74,6  73,0  77,5  77,6  76,4  74,2  74,8  74,1  83,6  90,9  87,3 
Source: IMF and author’s own calculations. 
 
Notes: 
1. Beginning of the year.  
2. Adjusted for the effect of compensated balance rates of 25% and 40%. 
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More controversial is the extent of regulation and its effectiveness on the lending 
rates. Kitagawa and Kurusawa (1994) explain that “short term interest rates at private 
financial institutions for individual loans under one year in maturity were determined 
within a band between the maximum interest rate set by the TIRAL and the prime rate 
set by the Federation of Bankers Association of Japan ... Neither TIRAL nor MOF set 
explicit limits on long term lending. ... In fact however, the ‘long term prime rate’  
charged  on  high  quality  corporations  such  as  electric  power  companies  was 
determined by the parties concerned and the government authorities using implicit 
rates” (p. 85-86). Although there are other sources of descriptive information about 
the government’s involvement in the formation of lending rates, below we provide 
evidence of this fact directly from the data on the lending rates.  
  Relatively  higher  interest  rates  in  Japan  compared  to  developed  economies 
have been the basis of McKinnon’s and Horiuchi’s presenting Japan as a case of an 
unrepressed financial market during the HGP18. Figure 1 shows the course of lending 
rates in Japan, USA and UK19. Japanese lending rates have been far higher than the 
rates in USA and UK until the late 1960s. Though not displayed in the Figure, the 
same  conclusion  is  true  for  the  comparison  of  lending  rates  in  Japan  and  other 
developed economies. 
  As argued earlier low interest rates are neither a sufficient nor a necessary 
condition of financial repression. In fact, the mere existence of compensating balances 
is  in  itself  evidence  that  the  lending  rates  were  subject  to  binding  regulations  as 
otherwise the banks would simply charge, on the borrowers, the rates under the market 
conditions  instead  of  using  the  cumbersome  method  of  compensating  balances. 
Furthermore, a direct comparison of the levels of interest rate accross countries as 
made  by  McKinnon  and  Horiuchi  may  be  misleading  as  the  Japanese  financial 
markets  were  isolated  from  the  international  financial  markets  due  to  the  capital 
controls during the HGP. 
  Nevertheless,  the  views  of  McKinnon  (and  Horiuchi)  weaken  when  we 
compare the various interest rates within Japan. Figure 2a presents the call money 
rates, bank lending rates, 3-month deposit rates and telephone bond yields. Naturally, 
these rates are not exactly comparable to each other as they belong to instruments of 
different maturities (all are annualized rates) and to different financial sub-markets. 
But again, as in Figure 1, they convey the main idea of my argument.   
                                                           
18See McKinnon(1991). 
19Because of data availability the rates displayed in Figure 1 are the US prime rate, open market 
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Call money rates and telephone bonds yields are two rates that are freely determined20. 
Moreover, they constitute the short and long end of the maturity range. Bank lending 
rates,  as  discussed  before,  are  at  best  mixed  in  terms  of  regulation.  Finally  bank 
deposit rates were totally regulated. Figure 2a provides us with two sets of important 
observations. Firstly, it shows that lending rates in Japan are much less volatile than 
the unregulated call money rates and telephone bond rates. Bank rates are less volatile 
than interbank or bond rates in other countries as well but clearly the difference in 
volatility  in  the  Japanese  case  is  striking,  suggesting,  at  least  some  effective 
administrative  control  on  the  Japanese  lending  rates.  This  is  clearly  seen  when 
compared to the striking co-movement of call rates and prime rates in USA in Figure 
2B.  Finally,  as  Figure  1  shows,  Japanese  lending  rates  are  much  less  volatile 
compared to those in the UK and USA.  
  The second important feature of Figures 2A and 2B is that, generally during 
the  HGP,  the  call  money  rates21  have  been  above  the  level  of  lending  rates. 
Furthermore, the telephone bond yield, representing the longer end of the  spectrum of 
the freely determined interest rates have also been above the lending rates after their 
start in 1961.  
  Given these findings around Figure 2A and 2B, our argument is that clearly 
certain  interest  rates  during  the  HGP  such  as  the  lending  rates  and  definitely  the 
deposit rates have been lower compared to what they would have been, had they been 
determined freely in the market.  
  The final piece of evidence about the ‘low’ Japanese interest rates is depicted 
in Figures 3 and 4 where real ex-post bank lending rates and real ex-post deposit rates 
are displayed. In view of the fact that during the HGP inflation rates measured by CPI 
on the one hand and WPI and GNP deflator on the other diverged considerably, the 
figures include the real rates deflated by all of these three measures22. 
  The first thing apparent in Figure 3 is that real lending rates deflated by WPI is 
considerably  higher  than  those  deflated  by  CPI  and  the  GNP  deflator.  McKinnon 
(1991) and Horiuchi (1984) uses series deflated by WPI to argue that real rates in 
Japan were high comparatively. Figure 3 shows that this conclusion changes when 
                                                           
20Goldsmith (1983). 
21Note that call money rate is of very short maturity. 
22The average annual inflation rates during 1953-1973 were 1.3% in WPI, 4.4% in CPI and 4.2% in 
GNP deflator.   10 
either CPI or the GNP deflator is used. Real lending rates have been on the average 
about 3% starting with late 1950s when the deflation is made either by the CPI or the 
deflator. 
  Figure 4 displays the real deposit rates. As the three month deposit rates were 
fixed nominally at 4% and the inflation rates measured by CPI and deflator surpassed 
this level starting with late 1950s, real rates became negative. When the WPI is used 
as the GNP deflator, real deposit rates again become higher averaging about 3%. Thus 
the same divergence in conclusion emerges.  
  Overall, the evidence in Figures 3 and 4 shows that it is difficult to argue that 
real interest rates were “high” during the HGP. Against the argument of McKinnon 
(1991) which states that WPI “represents ... a wide range of tradable goods” and is the 
relevant alternative to yen-denominated assets, it can well be argued that measuring 
price inflation by the CPI or the GNP deflator would represent the trade-off between 
consumption and financial saving better than using the WPI. It is therefore difficult to 
conclude that discussion and practically the conclusion on real lending rates is at best 
ambiguous  given  the  different  results  corresponding  to  different  indices  used  in 
deflation.    11 
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FIGURE 4: REAL 3 MONTH DEPOSIT RATES
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3. LIBERALIZATION IN THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
The financial liberalization process in Japan is generally considered to have started 
after 1974 and to have continued since then. There have been a number of reasons that 
triggered  the  process.  The  expansionary  monetary policy  conducted by  BOJ  in  an 
effort  to  finance  the  growth  coupled  with  the  effects  of  the  oil  crisis  led  to  high 
inflation reaching 17%23 in 1973 when it adopted a tight money policy to reverse the 
process. BOJ's contactionary monetary policy coincided with the first oil shock the 
same year. As a result of the ensuing disinflationary process, the inflation rate was 
curbed  to  7%  in  1975.  The  GNP  growth  rates  also  slowed  down  after  1973  and 
investment rates fell. 
  With  lower  investments  corporate  deficits  dropped  almost  by  half. 
Simultaneously  however,  the  general public sector deficits which were kept under 
control during the HGP started to take over and more than doubled between 1973 and 
1975.  These  asymmetric  movements  of  corporate  and  public  deficits  altered  the 
pattern of flow of funds that prevailed during the HGP.  
  As the domestic factors were reshaping the flow of funds within Japan, on the 
international front, with the high growth rates attained in the previous 20 years the 
country had already become an important world economy; an economy that could no 
more be ignored  by the rest of the world. In addition to the internal factors, there were 
also  growing  international  pressures  that  now  started  to  exert  influence  on  the 




Cargill  and  Royama  (1992)  explain why all the major domestic players supported 
liberalization  of  the  financial  markets.  The  government  faced  resistance  from  the 
banks and the securities companies in absorbing the increasing government debt after 
1975. In contrast, before 1975, at low levels of outstanding government debt, both the 
banks  and  the  securities  companies  had  been  willing  to  absorb  those  securities. 
Throughout  the  HGP  there  was  the  implicit  promise  of  the  BOJ  to  repurchase 
government  bonds  from  banks  with  a  premium  after  one  year.  The  banks  thus 
anticipated that they would be able to resell the government securities to the BOJ with 
a capital gain. The securities companies were willing to absorb the debt since they 
could use them in the -then- unofficial Gensaki (repurchase) market.  
  The  growth  of  government  debt  increased  the  size  of  the  Gensaki  market 
considerably. The growing Gensaki market in turn provided an unregulated short term 
investment market especially to the corporate sector which started to shift their bank 
deposits to the new market. With the increasing pressure from the banks that tended to 
lose funding sources, the authorities allowed the issuance of CDs in May 1979 which 
is considered as a major step towards the liberalization of interest rates. 
  Banks were supporting liberalization as they considered it to be an opportunity 
to  regain  their  share  in  the  financial  markets.  The  declining  corporate  physical 
investments and consequently lower corporate deficits had reduced the dependence of 
the  corporate  sector  on  banks.  The  corporate  sector  on  the  other  hand  was  also 
supporting liberalization. They faced increasing liquidity and their dependence on the 
banks had declined. Liberalization was seen to offer them better utilization of their 
extra liquidity. They had already started to use the unofficial Gensaki market heavily 
to utilize their excess liquidity in short term investments. Moreover, with reduced 
                                                           
23 WPI.   14 
dependence on bank credits, they did not have to hold large deposits in banks in the 
form of compensating balances. 
The  household  sector  was  also  for  liberalization  as  that  would  widen  the 
available  menu  of  financial  assets.  On  the  one  hand,  they simply expected higher 
returns  on  their  investments.  On  the  other,  the  reduced  growth  rates  effectively 
reduced the growth of their income and increased their reliance on their investments. 
Finally, the aging population had increased the emphasis on personal investments. 





While the liberalization policies before 1984 can mainly be attributed mainly to the 
aforementioned domestic factors those after 1984 were driven by international factors 
and  in  particular  by  the  efforts  of  USA.  These  factors  increased  the  pace  of 
liberalization that started in the second half of the seventies. 
  US pressure stemmed from the deterioration of its external balance. In the face 
of mounting current account deficits against Japan, USA was concerned about the 
effects of a weak yen. The American side located the reason of the appreciation of 
dollar vis-à-vis yen in the isolation of Japanese financial markets and pressed for the 
internationalization of  the yen as a measure to support it against dollar. In the bilateral 
talks between the Japanese Finance minister and the US Treasury Secretary in 1983, 
the Japanese side agreed upon three measures: to promote the internationalization of 
the yen, to deregulate Japanese capital and financial markets, and to help strengthen 
the yen. The establishment of a Yen/Dollar Committee was also agreed upon with the 
aim  of  following  up  the  joint  undertakings  and  investigating  the  possibility  of 
additional measures.  
  The findings of this committee was announced in 1984 and became the basis 
of the US-Japan Accord the same year. The new measures reduced restrictions on 
international bond issues (Euroyen activities) including Japanese resident borrowing, 
and bond issues by Japanese residents and foreigners. The limits on forward foreign 
exchange transactions and swap limit rules on Japanese banks were abolished. The 
access of foreign financial institutions to Japanese markets were eased and the limits 






Though the literature still leaves much to be investigated on the causal relationship 
between  finance  and  development,  financial  structure  obviously  has  important 
implications  on  the  growth  process  as  it  determines  the  transfer  of  savings  into 
physical investments. The issue of finance is naturally critical for countries that have 
not  completed  their  development  process.  The  current  orthodox  view  proposes 
liberalization of financial markets to achieve high growth rates. This view suggests 
that  financial  liberalization  will  trigger  higher  savings  and  thus  higher  physical 
investments in the developing countries. In almost all of the financial liberalization 
                                                           
24For a more detailed but still brief account of the liberalization after 1973 see Somel (1992). 
Comprehensive discussion on the same issue can be found in Osagi (1990), note 18, Suzuki, Y.(1986) 
and Takeda and Turner (1992).   15 
experiences so far, growth performance have not confirmed the expectations of this 
view. 
  The  examination  of  the  regulations  and  the  interest  rates  show  that  the 
Japanese example stands in stark contrast with the financial liberalization recipes that 
have been prepared for the developing countries starting with 1973 and which have 
been adopted by an increasing number of developing countries. During the Japanese 
high growth period the financial markets were highly regulated. It is far too ambitious 
to  try  to  prove  that  these  regulations  were  the  major  factor  that  caused  the  rapid 
growth and is beyond the scope of this paper. Clearly however, Japanese financial 
policy was a consistent and integral part of the Japanese industrial policy during the 
HGP. The liberalization started mainly because of external factors as explained.  
  The question of how low the “artificially low” interest rates in Japan were, has 
been the subject of other studies and not taken up here. But mthis study has shown 
that  the  government  has  been  involved  deeply  in  the  functioning  of  the  financial 
market during the HGP. McKinnon-Horiuchi’s approach represents an easy way out of 
the apperant paradox. The Japanese experience seems to be much more complicated 
one than they understand and promises to shed, through future research, an interesting 
light on the finance-growth nexus.  
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